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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF MINDFULNESS ON EXPOSURE AND EXTINCTION 
PROCESSES IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 
 
 
June 2012 
 
Michael Treanor, B.A., Loyola Marymount University 
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Boston 
 
Directed by Professor Lizabeth Roemer 
 
 The present study sought to examine the potential impact of brief mindfulness 
inductions to enhance exposure and extinction processes in social anxiety. Mindfulness 
may enhance extinction through increased awareness of multiple conditioned excitors 
(thereby “overpredicting” the occurrence of an aversive outcome) or by acting as a 
retrieval cue to mitigate return of fear. Twenty-two participants high in social anxiety 
were recruited to participate in a series of massed exposures. Latent growth curve 
analyses revealed that participants who received mindfulness inductions prior to exposure 
procedures demonstrated enhanced extinction learning as measured by expectancy 
ratings, but not when measured by distress, state anxiety or willingness. In Study 2, 
participants who received mindfulness inductions were invited back between 1 and 3 
weeks later to examine the potential of mindfulness to act as a retrieval cue to mitigate 
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return of fear. There appeared to be a non-significant return of fear, thereby limiting our 
ability to examine mindfulness as a retrieval cue. Results are discussed in terms of the 
basic science of conditioning and extinction.  
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CHAPTER 1 
SPECIFIC AIMS 
 
 As a group, anxiety disorders represent some of the most prevalent mental health 
difficulties today (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). Fortunately, cognitive-
behavioral therapies (CBT) have been established as efficacious for the treatment of 
anxiety disorders (Barlow, 2002; Chambless et al., 1996), and are often considered a first 
line treatment option for these disabling conditions. At the core of many cognitive-
behavioral treatments for anxiety disorders is exposure, or repeatedly confronting a 
feared stimulus while simultaneously abstaining from engaging in any avoidance 
behavior (Craske, 1999). Although the mechanisms behind exposure procedures are 
largely predicated upon models of extinction learning (discussed more fully below), 
many have argued that clinical researchers have not adequately taken into consideration 
advances in our understanding of extinction processes derived from basic science (e.g., 
Craske, Kircanski, Zelikowsky, Mystkowski, Chowdury, & Baker, 2008). A more 
thorough understanding of the basic science underlying extinction may help to improve 
current behavioral treatments for anxiety disorders.  
 In addition to traditional forms of cognitive and behavioral therapy, behavioral 
approaches that incorporate mindfulness and acceptance-based strategies have shown 
promise in the treatment of various anxiety disorders (Batten & Hayes, 2005; Dalrymple 
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& Herbert, 2007; Roemer, Orsillo, & Salters-Pedneault, 2008). Derived from Eastern 
traditions such as Buddhism, mindfulness refers to a process of focusing on experiences 
in the present moment in an open, non-judgmental, curious, and accepting manner 
(Kabat-Zinn, 1990, 2005). Although these approaches have demonstrated promising 
results, further research is needed to more precisely elucidate the ways in which 
mindfulness practice may enhance treatment for anxiety. One area that has yet to be fully 
explored is the manner in which mindfulness interventions might facilitate exposure 
processes. This is surprising, given the centrality of exposure and extinction processes in 
the treatment of anxiety disorders. However, numerous findings in both basic and clinical 
science point to the possibility that mindfulness interventions might facilitate exposure 
and extinction processes although no studies to date have directly examined this 
possibility. 
 Based on research in the basic science of conditioning and extinction, the overall 
aim of the present study was to examine the potential impact of brief mindfulness 
inductions on exposure and extinction processes in social anxiety disorder. Social anxiety 
disorder represents a prime candidate for this type of research given its a) high prevalence 
and disability (Kessler et al., 2005), b) amenability to laboratory-based examinations 
(Moscovitch & Hoffman, 2004), and c) focus as a treatment target for successful 
exposure-based anxiety disorder treatments (Gould, Buckminster, Pollack, Otto, & Yap, 
1997; Hope, Heimberg, & Bruch, 1995).  
 In undertaking this type of research, it is important to distinguish between the 
interventions themselves and the mechanisms of action underlying these interventions. 
For the purposes of this study, exposure or exposure-based procedures will refer to the 
3 
 
process of confronting a feared stimulus while abstaining from avoidance behavior. 
Extinction, or extinction learning, will refer to one of the mechanisms thought to underlie 
the efficacy of these approaches. The aims of the current study were to: 
1. Apply findings from basic science to the examination of the effect of a brief 
mindfulness manipulation on exposure and extinction processes. For example, 
we examined whether mindfulness inductions enhanced extinction learning, and 
whether or not mindfulness inductions during exposure procedures acted as a 
retrieval cue to mitigate the return of fear. 
2. Assess the feasibility of examining the effects of brief mindfulness 
manipulations on extinction learning. Given that this was one of the first 
studies to examine the effect of a mindfulness manipulation on extinction learning 
in anxiety disorders, it was important to assess the feasibility of conducting 
laboratory based assessments of this type. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
 
Conditioning and Anxiety 
 Although various theoretical orientations have provided explanations for the 
development, maintenance, and treatment of pathological anxiety, this study operated 
from within a behavioral or learning theory framework. Although a full examination of 
the research underlying both behavioral and learning theory is beyond the scope of the 
present study, a basic understanding of certain core principles, particularly those related 
to classical conditioning, will be helpful as we proceed to explore extinction processes.  
 The behavioral model of anxiety disorders is based on the assumption that anxiety 
is a learned or conditioned response. A particular cue comes to elicit a fearful or anxious 
response because of its association with an aversive consequence. This type of 
associative learning is most easily exemplified by examining Pavlov’s (1927) seminal 
series of experiments in which a previous neutral stimulus (a bell) came to elicit the same 
response in a canine (salivation) as an unlearned stimulus (food). This occurred because 
the sound of the bell often preceded the delivery of food. In short, the animal responded 
with salivation to the sound of the bell because it was a good predictor that food would be 
delivered. This process of learning has come to be known as either classical or Pavlovian 
conditioning, and it is a core processes in associative learning. 
5 
 
Many researchers initially argued that the association formed during classical 
conditioning was between the conditioned stimulus and unconditioned response (known 
as a stimulus-response or S-R relationship; Bouton, 2006). However, numerous findings 
from basic science point to the formation of a different association. In one seminal 
experiment, Rescorla (1973) conditioned rats to fear a light by pairing it with a klaxon (a 
device that produces a loud noise). Following conditioning, one group of rats received 
exposure to the klaxon alone (i.e., without the light) until their fear habituated. These rats 
were less afraid of the light when tested once again. If the initial relationship that had 
formed were between the stimulus and response (the light and the fear), the animals 
would have still responded fearfully when presented with the light in a subsequent 
experiment. Rescorla (1973) argued that the initial relationship that formed was between 
the light and the klaxon (a stimulus-stimulus, or S-S relationship). Several studies have 
confirmed this finding (Holland, 1990; Holland & Rescorla, 1975). This does not mean 
that stimulus-response relationships do not form. These are the norm in operant 
conditioning, and can form in classical conditioning as well. In the latter case, this 
usually occurs after numerous pairings. However, the primary relationship in classical 
conditioning remains a S-S relationship (Bouton, 2006). 
 This model of conditioning can be applied to clinical disorders as well. In the case 
of anxiety disorders, an individual may respond with anxiety or fear to certain cues 
because of their association with an aversive outcome. For example, in social phobia an 
individual may respond with fear when presented with the possibility of giving a speech 
in front of others. This is because the act of giving a speech is assumed to be a good 
predictor of an aversive outcome such as social exclusion or humiliation (i.e., an S-S 
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relationship). Of course, the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders is a 
complex process, with factors such as second order conditioning, stimulus generalization, 
latent inhibition, and interoceptive conditioning playing important roles (Bouton, Mineka, 
& Barlow, 2001; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Nevertheless, a wealth of research from 
basic science and clinical studies point to the explanatory power of learning theory and 
classical conditioning in regards to the etiology and treatment of anxiety disorders 
(Acheson, Forsyth, Prenoveau, & Bouton, 2007; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006).  
 Given that classical conditioning represents a core process in the behavioral 
account of anxiety disorders, and formed the foundation upon which this study was 
based, it is important to explore it in more detail. Rescorla and Wagner (1972) proposed 
the following theory to explain many of the mechanisms underlying classical 
conditioning. They suggested that the strength of conditioning was governed by several 
factors including the salience of the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli (CS and US 
respectively), in addition to the magnitude and surprisingness of the US. They provided 
the following equation (a modified version of the learning curve) to illustrate the 
connection between these various factors and their affect on associative learning: 
∆V = αβ(λ- ∑V) 
where ∆V is the change in associative strength (or predictive value) for a given stimulus, 
α and β are the salience of the CS and US respectively, λ is the upper magnitude of the 
US, and ∑V represents the sum of the associative strength of all stimuli present during 
the trial.  
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 Although this is an equation, it is not meant to illustrate precise numbers or 
changes in associative strength, but merely to illustrate the importance of the various 
factors governing associative learning. One simply inserts numbers greater than or equal 
to zero in order to determine how various factors affect learning. Although it is beyond 
the scope of the present study to summarize all of the evidence in favor of the Rescorla-
Wagner model, it is important to note that the model, and its subsequent derivations, has 
been an important force in the basic science of conditioning and extinction. Its ability to 
parsimoniously explain and predict numerous findings (such as blocking, deepened 
extinction, etc.) has allowed it to remain relevant to discussions of associative learning 
for the past several decades (Bouton, 2006). Although it is presented briefly here, it will 
be important when discussing mechanisms of extinction in subsequent sections. 
Behavioral Treatments for Anxiety Disorders: Exposure and Extinction 
 From a behavioral perspective, learned or conditioned anxiety is treated by having 
the individual repeatedly confront a feared conditioned stimulus while simultaneously 
abstaining from any avoidance behavior (Craske, 1999). Within the clinical literature 
these interventions are collectively known as exposure or exposure-based procedures, and 
they form the core component of many behavioral and cognitive-behavioral treatments 
for anxiety disorders (Barlow, 2002). Indeed, several studies comparing treatments solely 
comprised of exposure-based interventions to those containing exposure plus additional 
elements (e.g., cognitive restructuring) have yielded no additional benefit to the 
combined treatment package (e.g., Foa et al., 2005; Hope, Heimberg, & Bruch, 1995). 
This has prompted some researchers to argue that exposure represents the primary 
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component responsible for change in the treatment of anxiety disorders (Foa, Rothbaum, 
& Furr, 2003). 
 By repeatedly presenting a given cue in the absence of the US, a new inhibitory 
association is formed. The organism comes to view the conditioned stimuli as no longer 
the best predictor of the occurrence of the unconditioned stimuli. As a result, conditioned 
responding is mitigated. For example, in social anxiety disorder, by repeatedly having the 
individual confront cues previously associated with social rejection or exclusion in the 
absence of these aversive consequences, the individual learns that the presence of these 
cues (e.g., giving a speech) is no longer a strong predictor of the negative outcome. The 
individual is then likely to display less fear in social situations. This process is known as 
extinction learning and is thought to be a core mechanism of action underlying these 
interventions (Vansteenwegen, Dirikx, Hermans, Vervliet, & Eelen, 2006)
1
. 
 By returning once again to the Rescorla-Wagner model, one can gain a better 
understanding of the precise process of extinction learning. Once again, this model 
postulates that associative learning is governed by several factors including the salience 
of the CS and US, the magnitude of the US, and the sum of the associative strength of all 
the conditioned stimuli present on any given trial [∆V = αβ(λ- ∑V)]. Bouton (2006) 
                                                 
1
 Many researchers have argued that habituation is another important mechanism of 
action in the treatment of anxiety disorders (e.g., Foa & Kozak,1986). However, 
habituation is most commonly explained as a decrease in responding to a stimulus that 
elicits an innate or unlearned response (e.g., orienting to a particular stimulus, startle 
reaction, etc.). Yet rarely do clinicians expose clients to a stimulus that elicits an innate 
response in the context of therapy. Clients are exposed to conditioned stimuli that are 
thought to predict the occurrence of an aversive event (e.g., traumatic memory in post 
traumatic stress disorder, social interaction in social phobia), but not to the actual US 
itself (actual trauma, social rejection, etc.). 
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provides the following example in order to illustrate the process of extinction. Let us 
assume, for a given conditioned stimulus (X) an excitatory strength of 1 and a salience of 
.2. Inasmuch as extinction trials involve the non-occurrence of the US, we will place a 
value of 0 for λ.  
∆Vx = .2(0-1) = -.2 
Therefore, the Rescorla-Wagner model predicts a decrease in the associative strength of 
stimulus X. 
 A wealth of research in both animal and human populations lends support to 
process of extinction learning and the decrease in associative strength underlying it. For 
example, when conditioning fear in human samples, it is standard to measure an 
individual’s expectancy that a particular CS will result in the delivery of a US. During 
extinction training these expectancy ratings, along with sympathetic arousal, often 
decrease, indicating a decrease in the associative strength between a particular cue (CS) 
and an aversive outcome (US;Vansteenwegen et al., 2005). Bouton (2004) has also 
summarized the evidence for various processes that may underlie extinction learning and 
has concluded that the evidence is most consistent with changes in associative strength 
instituted by violations in the expectancy that a US will occur. This is precisely what is 
implied by error-correction models such as those outlined by Rescorla and Wagner 
(1972). 
 Although this change in associative strength and prediction of aversive 
consequences is a prime candidate for the efficacy of extinction procedures, it is 
important to note that not all clinical studies of exposure procedures attempt to measure 
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this type of learning. Clinical researchers often use changes in symptom ratings, levels of 
distress, fear of aversive outcomes, and willingness to approach feared situations or 
objects (e.g. behavioral approach tasks) as indicators of successful exposure treatment 
(e.g., Hofmann & Barlow, 2002). However, given that exposure procedures are modeled 
closely on extinction procedures, and that extinction has been found to result in changes 
in the expectancy of aversive outcomes, it is highly probable that exposure procedures 
function by similar processes. Future research with clinical samples would be served by 
more direct measures of changes in associative strength and expectancy of aversive 
outcomes.  
 In summary, behavioral models and learning theories have provided a solid basis 
for understanding conditioning and extinction, as well as the mechanisms underlying 
these processes. In regards to extinction, these mechanisms include decreases in 
associative strength and expectancy of harm as explained by the Rescorla-Wagner model.  
However, in order to elucidate the ways in which mindfulness may positively impact 
exposure and extinction processes, it will be necessary to first examine conditions for 
enhancing as well as retaining extinction learning, while simultaneously considering 
alternative theories on the mechanisms underlying exposure. These subjects are 
considered in the following sections.  
 
Enhancing Extinction Learning: Multiple Excitors 
 An interesting finding in early conditioning studies was that by reinforcing two or 
more conditioned excitors (i.e., stimuli that predict the occurrence of the US) together 
during conditioning, the stimuli actually decreased in associative strength. In these 
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studies, two stimuli (e.g., A and B) are both paired with an unconditioned stimulus 
separately. Although both were strongly conditioned predictors on their own, when 
presented together in conjunction with the US, they actually lost associative strength. 
That is, even though the US was delivered, conditioning actually decreased (Kremer, 
1978; Rescorla, 1970). The Rescorla-Wagner model actually predicts this, as it 
emphasizes the sum of all the stimuli present on a given trial (∑V). In essence, the 
combined excitatory strength of both conditioned stimuli actually overpredicted the 
strength or occurrence of the US. This became known as the overexpectation effect 
(Bouton, 2006). When the strength of the US is less than that predicted by the 
conditioned stimuli, conditioned associations weaken (i.e., conditioning decreases) 
whether or not the US is actually delivered.  
 This finding points to the importance the Rescorla-Wagner’s model emphasis on 
the summation of all conditioned stimuli present on any given trial. It also points to a 
unique possibility in regards to extinction. As discussed previously, extinction learning 
implies a loss of associative strength as an organism learns that a given conditioned 
stimulus is no longer a strong predictor that the unconditioned stimulus will be delivered. 
Therefore, what would happen if one extinguished two or more excitatory stimuli 
simultaneously? Similar to the overexpectation effect, the Rescorla-Wagner model 
predicts a greater decrease in associative strength (i.e., heightened extinction). For 
example, whereas our previous extinction equation obtained a decrease in associative 
strength of -.2, the following equation, combining the excitatory strength of two 
conditioned stimuli, results in the following decrease: 
∆Vx = .2[0-(1 + .7) ] = -.34 
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 As in the overexpectation effect, the combined excitatory strength of the two 
conditioned stimuli create a heightened expectation that the US will occur. When the US 
does not occur, as in extinction, there is a greater loss in associative strength precisely 
because of the large discrepancy between what was predicted and what actually occurred. 
Learning, or in this case extinction learning, is affected by discrepancies between what is 
predicted and what actually occurs (Bouton, 2006).  
 Despite the possibility of enhanced extinction implicated in the Rescorla-Wagner 
model, very few experimental studies have examined this possibility. However, in a 
series of experiments, Rescorla (2000) examined extinction of a stimulus (A) alone, in 
conjunction with another excitatory stimulus (X), in conjunction with a neutral stimulus 
(i.e., a non-excitatory stimulus; B), or the stimulus itself was spared extinction. The 
subjects’ reactions to the target stimulus (i.e., stimulus A) were then examined during a 
test the following day. Consistent with the predictions of the Rescorla-Wagner model, 
extinction learning was greatest in those subjects receiving extinction to the compound 
excitatory stimuli (AX).  
 Thomas and Ayres (2004) also examined the possibility of heightened extinction 
of multiple conditioned excitors using an ABA study design. In an ABA design, subjects 
are conditioned in one context (A), extinction is undertaken in another context (B), and 
subjects are returned to the original context in order to test for fear to the target stimulus. 
This is a powerful test of extinction learning, as extinction is often highly context 
dependent (discussed more fully below). As in the Rescorla (2000) study, the authors 
found heightened extinction to the target stimulus when it was combined with other 
conditioned excitors (Thomas & Ayres, 2004) 
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 As with many experiments in the basic science of conditioning and extinction, the 
preceding experiments were conducted with animal subjects. There have been relatively 
few studies examining extinction with multiple conditioned excitors in human subjects.  
However, combining multiple feared stimuli during a given exposure is a common 
element in many behavioral treatments for anxiety disorders. During treatment for panic 
disorder, an individual may be encouraged to enter a previously avoided situation (in vivo 
exposure) while simultaneously being exposed to multiple physiological cues for panic 
(elevated heart rate, dizziness, etc.; Craske et al., 2008, Craske & Barlow, 2008). It is 
possible that the presence of multiple cues actually enhances these exposure procedures.  
 Recent findings from experimental manipulations of exposure procedures in 
human anxiety disorders are also relevant to this discussion. Wolitzky and Telch (2009) 
compared exposure alone to exposure plus “oppositional action” in a sample of eighty-
eight individuals with acrophobia. Individuals in both conditions were gradually exposed 
to a series of heights in a stairwell. Individuals proceeded up to next level on the stairwell 
when their reported distress had decreased by thirty points (out of a 0-100 scale). 
Individuals in the exposure plus oppositional action condition were exposed to the same 
cues, but were simultaneously asked to engage in several “oppositional actions” while 
conducting the exposure. These included stepping closer to the edge of the railing, 
placing their hands behind their back, inducing dizziness while standing at the edge of the 
railing, and even running towards the edge of the railing with their hands behind their 
back (with the therapist present to ensure safety). In essence, the participants in this 
condition were exposed to multiple cues related to their fear simultaneously (e.g., 
standing close to the edge while dizzy, etc.). Participants in the exposure plus 
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oppositional action condition demonstrated enhanced extinction learning as assessed 
through behavioral approach tasks and questionnaires compared to the exposure only 
condition, with some of these differences maintained when assessed one month later.  
 Similarly, Nelson, Deacon, Lickle, and Sy (2010) compared the efficacy of 
probability-based exposures versus cost-based exposures in individuals high in public 
speaking anxiety. Probability-based exposures are standard in cognitive-behavioral 
treatments for social phobia and entail confronting feared situations and violating 
expectancies that a particular US will occur (thereby altering an individual’s probability 
bias). Individuals in the cost-based exposure condition where asked to deliberately 
engage in embarrassing behaviors during their exposure (e.g., stuttering, pausing for 10 
secs, making foolish statements), thereby altering the perceived cost of performing 
“foolishly”. Participants in the cost-based condition demonstrated significantly greater 
improvements on measures of social anxiety than those in the other condition. Once 
again, it is possible that this enhanced extinction was due to the presence of multiple 
conditioned excitors during a given exposure (e.g., the speech task in conjunction with 
embarrassing behaviors).  
 Although these studies raise interesting questions in regard to the use of multiple 
conditioned excitors in the treatment of anxiety disorders, it is important to note that the 
authors did not intend to directly manipulate or examine the effects of multiple 
conditioned excitors. These studies therefore do not provide direct evidence for the role 
of multiple conditioned excitors in extinction learning. For example, Wolitzky and Telch 
(2009) noted that participants in the oppositional action group displayed greater peak fear 
levels than individuals in the exposure only group. It is possible that the between-group 
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differences were a result of differing degrees of difficulty. The oppositional action group 
may have performed more difficult exposures (i.e., exposures that would be towards the 
higher end of a fear hierarchy), and this may have resulted in greater violation of 
expectancies (Wolitzky & Telch, 2009) whether or not the subjects were aware of 
multiple conditioned excitors. Moreover, some reports have indicated that greater initial 
fear levels are associated with improved outcomes (Foa, Riggs, Massie, & Yarczower, 
1995; Kozak, Foa, & Steketee, 1988).  
 Despite the promise of heightened extinction through the use of multiple 
conditioned excitors, not all of the experimental evidence is consistent in this regard. In 
fact, at least two studies examining extinction of conditioned fear in human samples have 
failed to find that extinction learning to a target cue benefited from the presence of 
multiple fear related cues (Lovibond, Davis, & O’Flaherty, 2000; Vervliet, 
Vansteenwegen, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007). Lovibond et al. (2000) suggest that this 
failure to demonstrate enhanced extinction may have been due to either external 
inhibition or a context effect. In external inhibition, the presence of additional, usually 
novel, cues disrupts attention to the target stimulus. Therefore, the individual fails to 
learn that the target cue was not associated with non-occurrence of the US. The authors 
also suggest that the presence of both cues represented a unique context during extinction 
training that failed to generalize to the test of the target stimulus on its own (Lovibond et 
al., 2000). That is, the individuals associated the non-occurrence of the US with the 
combined presence of both cues rather than with the cues individually.  
 It is important to note that in both the Lovibond et al. (2000) and Vervliet et al., 
(2007) studies the conditioned stimuli underwent extinction simultaneously. Rescorla 
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(2006) has summarized evidence suggesting that simultaneous extinction, rather than 
sequential followed by combined extinction, can actually result in less associative 
change. This largely has to do with the salience of each of the conditioned stimuli. When 
both conditioned stimuli are equally salient, they “compete” for the associative change 
that results from either conditioning or extinction. However, if one stimulus is more 
salient than the other, it will retain the larger share of associative change. This can be 
achieved in various ways. If one first conducts extinction with one variable (A), and then 
later combines this variable with the target variable (X), one can enhance the extinction 
of the target variable. This is because “A” will still retain some excitatory strength, 
thereby enhancing extinction when combined with X, but will also decrease in salience. 
This may occur naturally during exposure therapy as a client proceeds up her/his fear 
hierarchy. As the client proceeds up her/his hierarchy towards increasingly anxiety 
provoking stimuli, s/he is likely to encounter other stimuli that were previously 
extinguished as part of previous exposure sessions. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of 
research examining this possibility in clinical samples.  
 In addition, one could only conduct a few extinction trials with the combined 
stimuli. Rescorla (2006) argues that merely conducting a few extinction trials will 
enhance extinction through combined excitatory prediction, before the additional 
stimulus has time to overshadow attention to the target cue.  
 In sum, both theoretical and experimental evidence points to the possibility of 
enhanced extinction learning through the presence of multiple conditioned excitors, 
although not all of the evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. However, despite the 
efficacy of extinction procedures, either to a single stimulus or in combination with 
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multiple conditioned excitors, a wealth of evidence points to the difficulty in retaining 
this learning. The following section will explore research explaining this process, with an 
emphasis on ways to maintain extinction learning in various contexts.  
Enhancing Extinction Learning: Retaining Inhibitory Associations 
 Despite the use of the term extinction, a wealth of evidence indicates that 
conditioned associations are not erased or “extinguished” completely. Under the right 
circumstances the individual or organism will once again display fear or other 
conditioned responding despite having undergone extinction. For example, in 
reinstatement, simply presenting the US on its own after extinction can cause conditioned 
responding to reoccur to the CS (Rescorla & Heath, 1975). In renewal, the organism once 
again responds with fear to the CS after fear had been extinguished in another context 
(Bouton, 2002). This is often demonstrated through the ABA design mentioned 
previously, in which conditioning occurs in one context, extinction in another, and then 
the organism is tested for conditioned responding to the CS in the original context. The 
original observation of recovery of conditioned responding was termed spontaneous 
recovery. In spontaneous recovery, conditioned responding returns simply after the 
passage of time (Pavlov, 1927). Within the clinical literature on anxiety disorders, the 
renewal of fear following exposure treatment has been described as the “return of fear” 
(Rachman, 1989).  
 In summarizing the evidence on the return of conditioned responding following 
extinction, Bouton and colleagues (Bouton, 2002; 2004; Bouton, Westbrook, Corcoran, 
& Maren, 2006) have convincingly argued that these renewal effects are a result of the 
context dependent nature of extinction learning. According to this viewpoint, during 
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extinction training certain contextual cues, in addition to any explicit cues such as 
conditioned stimuli, come to be associated with the non-occurrence of the US. However, 
the original CS-US association remains intact. In essence, the organism is left with two 
associations: the CS predicts the US, and the CS does not predict the US. The organism 
relies on contextual cues to determine which relationship is operating at any given point 
in time. These contextual cues can be related to the physical location of the extinction 
training or even the internal state of the organism (Bouton et al., 2006). In the absence of 
contextual cues related to extinction learning, the organism once again resorts to the 
original conditioned association (e.g., fear). This learning does not seem to be unique to 
extinction training, but rather to most secondarily learned associations (Bouton, 2004). 
The decrease in associative strength as outlined in the Rescorla-Wagner model above is 
likely to still be operative, but is also highly context dependent.  
 Fortunately, there are methods for enhancing retrieval of this context dependent 
learning in order to mitigate renewal or return of fear. One could conduct exposure and 
extinction in multiple contexts in order to increase the number of cues that are associated 
with extinction (Vansteenwegen et al., 2006). However, experimental evidence suggests 
that this does not always mitigate renewal of conditioned responding, and it still may 
leave the individual subject to a return of fear if they encounter the stimulus in a novel 
context (Bouton, García-Gudtiérrez, Zilski, & Moody, 2006). Other promising evidence 
relates to the use of retrieval cues, present both during extinction and in the new context.  
 In a series of experiments, Brooks and Bouton (1994) conducted conditioning and 
extinction training with rats. Following extinction, the rats were then tested for renewal 
of conditioned responding to the CS in a different context. As expected, the rats once 
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again displayed conditioned responding when tested in this new context. However, this 
responding was mitigated if a cue was presented at re-test (e.g., a light) that was also 
present during extinction training. The cue appeared to “retrieve” the memory of 
extinction training, thereby indicating that the CS was unlikely to result in the delivery of 
the US. A novel cue, as well as a cue that was present during conditioning, did not have 
the same effect. It also appears that the cue did not develop a direct relationship with the 
US (e.g., an inhibitory relationship). Rather it seemed to function as a negative occasion 
setter in that it “set the occasion” for which CS-US relationship would be operating at 
that time (Brooks & Bouton, 2004).  
 Similar results demonstrating the efficacy of retrieval cues have been obtained in 
human subjects. Mystkowski, Craske, Echiverri, and Labus (2006) conducted a series of 
exposures with forty-eight spider fearful individuals. Following exposure procedures, 
several individuals were tested for a return of fear to the spiders 1-week later in a 
different context. Prior to the re-test, half of the sample was asked to recall the treatment 
procedures from their exposure training (retrieval cue condition), whereas the other 
participants were merely asked to focus on another memory. Participants in the retrieval 
cue condition reported significantly less return of fear than participants in the non-
retrieval cue condition with large effect sizes. It is important to note that this effect was 
seen in self-reported levels of distress, and did not extend to all measures of fear (e.g., 
behavioral avoidance, catastrophic cognitions).  
 In summary, behavioral models have provided several mechanisms for 
understanding the conditioning and extinction of fear. Research in both animal and 
human populations have demonstrated the validity and efficacy of these approaches, and 
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have even suggested ways for enhancing extinction learning (e.g., through the use of 
multiple excitors). However, current conceptualizations of extinction learning also 
suggest that the original conditioned association is neither extinguished nor erased. 
Rather, it appears that an individual forms a second inhibitory association. This 
association tends to be highly context specific, and a return of conditioned responding 
(e.g., fear) is often seen when the individual confronts the CS in a context that differs 
from the one in which exposure or extinction occurred. Fortunately, this return of fear can 
be mitigated by presenting a retrieval cue during re-test that was associated with the 
extinction context. With this foundation in place, it is now possible to explore the various 
ways in which mindfulness interventions may enhance exposure and extinction 
processes.  
Mindfulness 
 Drawn from eastern spiritual traditions such as Buddhism, mindfulness refers to a 
process of focusing on experiences in the present moment in an open, non-judgmental, 
curious, and accepting manner (Kabat-Zinn, 1990, 2005). As mindfulness interventions 
have gained greater popularity in psychological discussions, numerous attempts have 
been made to more formally operationalize it as a construct, as well as to elucidate its 
precise mechanisms of action (e.g., Baer, 2003; Bishop et al., 2004; Shapiro, Carlton, 
Astin, & Freedman, 2006). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these 
discussions in depth, it is important to briefly examine the construct of mindfulness, 
along with its potential mechanisms of action, in order to more precisely situate our 
current discussion.  
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 As implied by the definition above, mindfulness refers to a particular type of 
awareness of one’s present experience. The goal of this awareness is increased contact 
with the present moment, and all that entails, without attempts at labeling, judging, 
avoiding, or attaching to one’s thoughts and emotions (Bishop et al., 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 
1990). Several mechanisms have been posited to underlie the efficacy of mindfulness-
based approaches in the treatment of psychopathology. These include increased 
awareness, along with the ability to see one’s thoughts and emotions from a decentered 
perspective (i.e., as transitory experiences rather than never ending states or indications 
of absolute truth; Teasdale et al., 2002). In addition, mindfulness may function as a form 
of exposure as numerous clinical problems stem from rigid attempts to avoid aversive 
internal experiences (Baer, 2003; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Mindfulness may 
also reduce the added distress that results from rigid attempts to control or suppress one’s 
thoughts and emotions (Roemer & Orsillo, 2009).  
 While the construct of mindfulness is often thought of within the confines of 
meditation, it need not be. The skill of mindfulness can be cultivated through both formal 
(e.g., meditation) and informal practices (Roemer & Orsillo, 2009). It is also important to 
note that the emphasis in mindfulness practice is on the process as opposed to any 
particular state (either cognitive, emotional, or physiological; Bishop et al., 2004). To the 
extent that one is engaging in the process of mindful attention to the present moment, 
she/he is engaging in mindfulness. For example, during exercises that emphasize mindful 
awareness of the breath, an individual might find her/his attention continually pulled 
away from the breath by other thoughts. The process of noticing this, and gently returning 
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one’s attention to the breath in a non-judgmental manner, is mindfulness (Roemer & 
Orsillo, 2009).   
 Mindfulness or mindfulness-based interventions have shown promise in the 
treatment of numerous disorders, including chronic pain (Kabat-Zinn, 1990, for a review) 
and depression (Teasdale et al., 2002). However, its function as an intervention for 
anxiety disorders is of most relevance to the present discussion. Several researchers have 
sought to examine how mindfulness-based or acceptance-based therapies may function in 
the treatment of anxiety disorders. These include Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
(ACT) as a unified protocol for various anxiety disorders (Eifert & Forsyth, 2005; Eifert, 
Forsyth, Arch, Espejo, Keller, & Langer, 2009), as well as studies of ACT for specific 
disorders such as social anxiety disorder (Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007), obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Twohig, Hayes, Masuda, 2006) and post-traumatic stress disorder 
(Orsillo & Batten, 2005). ACT is a multifaceted approach to behavior change that argues 
that attempts at control of one’s internal experiences (thoughts, emotions) can 
paradoxically increase distress. ACT incorporates various mindfulness strategies to foster 
acceptance of one’s internal experience while encouraging behavioral action in valued 
domains regardless of one’s level of distress (Hayes et al., 1999). While these studies 
demonstrated promising results, all of them were reports on case studies (e.g., Eifert et 
al., 2009; Orsillo & Batten, 2005; Twohig et al., 2006), or  open trials (Dalrymple & 
Herbert, 2007) rather than controlled outcome studies, which limits the ability to 
conclude that ACT itself was responsible for any observed changes. In addition, ACT is a 
multifaceted treatment approach. Dismantling studies and process research may help to 
shed light on the precise role of mindfulness in client change. 
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 Roemer and Orsillo (2005, 2009) have also developed an acceptance-based 
behavioral therapy (ABBT) for generalized anxiety disorder that employs numerous 
mindfulness-based interventions. This ABBT employs mindfulness interventions in order 
alter one’s relationship to their internal experience, thereby reducing attempts at 
experiential avoidance. This is based on the theory that rigid attempts at altering or 
avoiding one’s internal state lie at the heart of psychopathology, and often paradoxically 
increases one’s level of distress (Hayes et al., 1999; Roemer & Orsillo, 2009). In 
addition, mindfulness practice may help to bring greater awareness and clarity to the 
client’s emotional experience, which helps to facilitate value guided action (Roemer & 
Orsillo, 2009). Thus far, this ABBT has demonstrated promising results in the treatment 
of GAD (Roemer et al., 2008), although further exploration of the process and 
mechanisms of change is underway (e.g., Hayes, Orsillo, & Roemer, 2010).  
 Although mindfulness-based interventions have shown promise in the treatment 
of anxiety disorders, there has been a dearth of research on how precisely mindfulness 
may impact exposure and extinction processes. This is surprising, given the centrality of 
exposure-based procedures for the treatment of anxiety disorders, and the promise of 
mindfulness and acceptance-based interventions. Although many mindfulness researchers 
have acknowledged that mindfulness may act as a form of exposure, in that it encourages 
contact with avoided aversive emotions and thoughts (Baer, 2003; Twohig, Masuda, 
Varra, & Hayes, 2005), they have neglected to take into account findings from basic 
science. However, numerous findings from the basic science of extinction learning 
discussed above point to possible ways in which mindfulness may positively impact 
exposure and extinction processes. The following sections explore these possibilities.  
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Mindfulness and Extinction Learning 
 An inherent component of mindfulness practice is the cultivation of attention and 
awareness. While the focus of this awareness and attention may differ by the particular 
mindfulness exercise, the ultimate goal is broadened awareness of one’s present moment 
experience (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). In the treatment of pathological anxiety, this broadened 
awareness may facilitate extinction learning through increased awareness and attention to 
multiple conditioned excitors. As discussed previously, the presence of multiple excitors 
helps to facilitate extinction by “overpredicting” the occurrence of the US, thereby 
increasing the discrepancy between what is predicted and what occurs (Rescorla, 2006). 
While multiple excitors might be present during any given exposure procedure, the 
individual may fail to be aware of them. Mindfulness interventions may naturally help to 
increase awareness of these cues. 
 Several experimental studies point to the benefits of mindfulness practice on 
one’s awareness or attentional capacity. Jha, Krompinger, and Baime (2007) examined 
various attentional subsystems, including alerting, orienting, and conflict monitoring, in 
both seasoned and novice meditators. Attentional systems were measured using the 
Attentional Network Test (ANT; Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). 
Performance on the ANT was measured before and after an 8-week course in 
mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) for the seventeen meditation naïve 
participants, before and after a one month intensive retreat in the experienced meditation 
group, and before and after an 8-week time period in the seventeen control participants. 
Results indicated that participants in the MBSR course demonstrated improved orienting 
compared to controls. That is, MBSR participants demonstrated an improved ability to 
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direct their attention (Jha et al., 2007). Moreover, following the intensive retreat, 
experienced meditators demonstrated an improvement in alerting, and this increased 
ability was also correlated with total meditation experience. The authors concluded that 
this reflected a more receptive awareness, corresponding to improved exogenous stimulus 
detection.  
 A similar improvement in stimuli detection was observed in untrained participants 
following randomization to an 8-week MBSR course. Anderson, Lau, Segal, and Bishop 
(2007) randomly assigned 86 participants to either an 8-week MBSR course or an 8-week 
waitlist control. Participants reported having no prior experience with meditation, yoga, 
or other mindfulness related activities. However, unlike the participants in the Jha  et al. 
(2007) study, participants in the mindfulness condition did not demonstrate improved 
voluntary attentional control. However, greater changes in mindfulness were associated 
with a greater ability at object detection.  
 Therefore, both the Jha et al. (2007) and Anderson et al. (2007) point to the 
possible relationship between mindfulness training and improved attentional capacities. 
More importantly, both studies suggest that an improvement in exogenous stimulus 
detection may be one benefit of mindfulness training. Inasmuch as mindfulness training 
may enhance stimulus detection, it may facilitate extinction learning through increased 
awareness of multiple conditioned excitors. However, as summarized above, evidence 
also suggests that the presence of multiple cues can actually detract from extinction 
learning if the cues are equally salient (Rescorla, 2006). Mindfulness training may only 
be helpful in this regard if one can maintain the salience of the target stimulus.  
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 Several studies point to the possibility that mindfulness practice can enhance an 
individual’s ability to maintain attention on a particular cue or task (sustained attention), 
despite the presence of distracter stimuli. Lutz, Slagter, Rawlings, Francis, Greishcar, and 
Davidson (2009) used a dichototic listening task to examine attentional capacities in a 
group of mindfulness meditators following a 3-month retreat. The authors collected 
neurophysiological measures, via electroencephalograph, in addition to behavioral 
measures such as reaction time. Results indicated an improved ability to sustain attention 
in practitioners following the meditation retreat, along with increases in stimulus 
processing of distracter stimuli. The authors argue that meditation may result “not only in 
a high frequency of moments of attention on the attended object (or increased attentional 
stability), but also to improve one’s ability to remain vigilant and monitor distracters 
without losing focus” (Lutz et al., 2007, p. 13426). These results match those of other 
studies which observed a correlation between improved ability to sustain attention and 
mindfulness meditation experience (Valentine & Sweet, 1999), or an increased ability to 
sustain attention in novice meditators following a short retreat (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 
2008). 
 Taken together, the results of the above studies suggest that mindfulness practice 
may be associated with an increased ability to detect multiple stimuli, while 
simultaneously maintaining focus on a target stimulus. However, even in the absence of 
awareness of multiple cues, the enhanced attentional capacity which results from 
mindfulness practice may be beneficial for extinction learning. A key facet of the 
Rescorla-Wagner model is the salience of the conditioned stimulus (α). By increasing the 
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salience of the conditioned stimuli, one can enhance extinction learning. Once again, it 
may be helpful to examine this with actual numbers. The initial equation for extinction 
presented previously was: ∆Vx = .2(0-1) = -.2. By increasing the salience of α to .4 we 
obtain the following decrease in associative strength ∆Vx = .4(0-1) = -.4. In essence, the 
less aware an individual is of a given CS, the less able she/he is to form a contingent 
relationship between a particular CS and the non-occurrence of the US (or occurrence of 
the US in conditioning trials). This corresponds to the importance on awareness 
highlighted in many models of classical conditioning (e.g., Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; 
Pearce & Hall, 1980). 
 In summary, experimental examinations of attention and mindfulness suggest 
numerous ways in which mindfulness may positively impact extinction learning 
including increased awareness of the CS, along with increased awareness of multiple 
conditioned excitors while maintaining the primary salience of a particular target 
stimulus. Although the studies described thus far are promising in these regards, there are 
important limitations and considerations worth noting.  
 First and foremost is the wide variation in level of mindfulness experience 
reported by the participants in various studies. Several studies (Jha et al., 2007; Lutz et 
al., 2009) examined attentional capacity in seasoned meditators. Even in studies in which 
novice meditators were examined, the training period often included a mindfulness retreat 
or course that was several weeks in duration. It remains unclear what level of 
mindfulness practice is necessary to achieve the attentional effects noted here. Indeed, the 
question of “dosage” remains an important empirical question that has yet to be 
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adequately addressed in the literature (Roemer & Orsillo, 2003). Moreover, it is not yet 
clear whether mindfulness practice elicits stable attentional changes, or whether engaging 
in the process of mindfulness is necessary to see these effects. For example, both the Lutz 
et al. (2009) and the Valentine and Sweet (1999) study asked participants to engage in 
mindfulness practices just prior to the attention task, whereas other authors (e.g., Jha et 
al., 2007) did not ask this of participants. It also is unclear which mindfulness practices 
may be most efficient for eliciting attentional improvements. Many of the studies 
described here employed a multifaceted meditation course (i.e., MBSR), or participants 
with years of experience in a variety of mindfulness and meditation practices. The variety 
of practices employed in mindfulness training include exercises that require the 
participant to maintain a focus on particular sensation, such as the breath or sounds, in 
addition to more advanced techniques that ask clients to mindfully observe their thoughts 
or emotions (Roemer & Orsillo, 2009). Particular mindfulness exercises may be better at 
eliciting particular attentional capacities. Finally, several of these studies were limited by 
methodological concerns such as limited randomization, and poor descriptions of the 
participant characteristics. However, despite these questions and limitations, the evidence 
is promising for the effect of mindfulness training on attentional capacity. Taken with the 
findings from the basic science of extinction learning discussed previously, it is possible 
that mindfulness training may enhance extinction learning through attentional 
mechanisms.  
Mindfulness as a Retrieval Cue 
 Perhaps the most straightforward benefit of conducting mindfulness interventions 
in conjunction with exposure-based procedures is the ability of mindfulness inductions to 
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act as a retrieval cue to mitigate the return of fear. As discussed previously, a wealth of 
evidence points to the context dependent nature of extinction learning (Bouton, 2004). 
When an individual or organism confronts a previously conditioned stimulus in a context 
that differs from that of extinction training, she/he is likely to display a renewal of 
conditioned responding unless contextual cues or conscious self-generated retrieval can 
retrieve the “extinguished” association between the CS and US. In experimental 
investigations of extinction in human samples, simply asking participants to recall the 
context in which extinction took place was sufficient to mitigate a return of fear 
(Mystkowski et al., 2006). By conducting mindfulness inductions along with exposure 
procedures, one has effectively associated the process of mindfulness with the extinction 
context. Should the client practice mindfulness when she/he encounters the feared 
stimulus (e.g., public speaking, traumatic memory) in another context, then the process of 
mindfulness should act as a retrieval cue to mitigate renewal of fear. There may be 
numerous reasons that one might wish to conduct mindfulness exercises as part of 
anxiety treatment, and researchers have outlined various arguments to support this 
proposition. Mindfulness may facilitate decentering (Baer, 2003; Roemer & Orsillo, 
2009) or may act as an emotion regulatory strategy (Erisman & Roemer, 2010). It may 
also help facilitate exposure and reduce efforts at experiential avoidance (Roemer & 
Orsillo, 2009). The present paper also argues that simply pairing mindfulness with 
exposure processes may provide the additional benefit of acting as a retrieval cue. 
Unfortunately, there have been no direct examinations of this possibility. However, given 
that retrieval cues as simple as lighting (Vansteenwegen et al., 2005) and instructions to 
recall the context which exposures occurred were effective in reducing the renewal of 
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fear, it is reasonable to expect that engaging in the process of mindfulness would act in a 
similar manner.  
 Thus far the present paper has argued that mindfulness may enhance extinction 
learning via mechanisms elucidated in the basic science of conditioning and extinction. 
However, it is also important to consider ways in which mindfulness may negatively 
impact extinction learning. The following section will briefly explore this possibility.  
Mindfulness as a Conditioned Inhibitor 
 In addition to mechanisms such as increased awareness, decentering and 
acceptance, some have suggested that mindfulness training may induce relaxation (Baer, 
2003). While increased relaxation may indeed be an occasional effect of mindfulness 
practice, it is not the goal of mindfulness interventions. Mindfulness practice encourages 
contact with emotional states, even aversive ones, absent attempts at trying to control or 
change them (e.g., relax them away). Nevertheless, the decrease in distress that may 
come from abandoning rigid attempts at control may be reinforcing for some individuals, 
and clients may inadvertently come to use mindfulness strategies as a means to avoid or 
reduce distress (Roemer & Orsillo, 2009). In this case the process of mindfulness may 
come to be viewed as a safety behavior and can interfere with successful extinction 
learning. In behavioral terms, safety behaviors function as conditioned inhibitors (stimuli 
with an inhibitory association that signal the non-occurrence of the US). When presented 
in conjunction with excitatory conditioned stimuli, the inhibitory “charge” of the 
conditioned inhibitory cancels out the positive associative strength of the conditioned 
excitor, which leads to no change in associative strength (Craske et al., 2008). In essence, 
they “protect” the CS from extinction (Lovibond et al., 2000). Common safety behaviors 
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include anxiolytic drugs, the presence of a trusted friend, or even distraction (Barlow, 
2002).Therefore, care must be taken when employing mindfulness practices in 
conjunction with exposure exercises in order to ensure that clients are not using them as a 
means of avoidance.  
 In addition to its use as a means of avoidance, there are other avenues through 
which mindfulness practices could possibly become conditioned inhibitors. The Rescorla-
Wagner model suggests that by presenting a cue with no associative strength during 
extinction, it will gradually develop an inhibitory association. For example, if 
mindfulness practices (or any other cue) had no previous association with the US, the 
reduction in associative strength that occurs as a result of extinction trials would steadily 
transform this neutral cue into a conditioned inhibitor (Bouton, 2006). When 
subsequently presented with the target cue during extinction, its inhibitory properties 
would protect the stimulus from extinction. Yet, extinction cues that mitigate the return 
of fear are also present during extinction, but evidence suggests that they function as 
negative occasion setters and not conditioned inhibitors (Brooks & Bouton, 1994). Unlike 
inhibitory or excitatory stimuli, occasion setters do not form a direct relationship with the 
US. Rather, they modulate the relationship between the CS and US by “setting the 
occasion” for which relationship is operative (Bouton, 2006). There may be several 
reasons why extinction cues function as occasion setters and not conditioned inhibitors. 
First, evidence suggests that occasion setting is most often formed when the occasion 
setter is presented before the CS in a sequential fashion, or when the extinction cue is less 
salient then the CS. Inhibitors are more likely to form when presented simultaneously in 
combination with the CS during extinction, or when the cue is as equally salient as the 
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CS (Bouton, 2006). In addition, studies testing the ability of extinction cues to act as 
retrieval cues often present the extinction cue on only some extinction trials (e.g., 75% of 
trials, Brooks & Bouton, 1994). By presenting the cue on only a portion of the extinction 
trials, the subject may be less likely to attribute the non-occurrence of the US solely to 
the extinction cue (i.e., like an inhibitor). If one were to apply this rationale to 
mindfulness practices, it may best to conduct mindfulness interventions just prior to an 
exposure procedure, and during only some of the exposure sessions. 
Summary  
 Recent behavioral treatments that incorporate mindfulness have shown promise in 
the treatment of several anxiety disorders (Batten & Hayes, 2005; Dalrymple & Herbert, 
2007; Roemer et al., 2008). Several mechanisms have been posited to underlie the 
efficacy of these approaches including decentering, experiential acceptance, and 
compassion. In addition to these mechanisms, mindfulness may be beneficial for anxiety 
disorder treatment by enhancing exposure and extinction processes. Recent findings in 
the basic science of extinction learning suggest that extinction can be enhanced through 
the presence of multiple conditioned excitors, and that retrieval cues can help mitigate 
renewal or return of fear. The increased attentional capacity that results from mindfulness 
may help facilitate awareness of multiple conditioned excitors. In addition, pairing 
mindfulness with extinction procedures may allow it to function as a retrieval cue. The 
current study sought to examine these possibilities, while simultaneously exploring the 
feasibility of laboratory-based examinations of mindfulness and extinction learning.  
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Hypotheses 
1. Hypothesis 1: Individuals receiving mindfulness inductions prior to 
exposure procedures would display enhanced extinction when compared 
to individuals receiving exposure alone. 
2. Hypothesis 2: Individuals receiving mindfulness inductions prior to 
exposure procedures would display enhanced extinction throughout a 
series of massed exposures, when compared to individuals receiving 
exposure alone 
3. Hypothesis 3: Individuals who receive a retrieval cue (i.e., another 
mindfulness induction) would display reduced return of fear when 
compared to individuals who do not receive a retrieval cue when tested in 
a different context, at a different time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
Sample 
 Four-hundred and ninety-two participants completed a screening packet 
administered online to a pool of students, faculty and staff at the University of 
Massachusetts, Boston. Participants were entered into a raffle for a $50 gift certificate in 
exchange for this initial screening. One-hundred and four met inclusion criteria for 
subsequent study procedures including a score above 30 on the Leibowitz Social Anxiety 
Scale-Self Report (LSAS-SR; Fresco et al., 2001), scoring 16 or above on the Personal 
Report of Confidence as a Speaker Scale (PRCS; Paul, 1966), being between the ages of 
18-64, and being fluent in English. Exclusion criteria include previous exposure 
treatment for social anxiety (e.g., in the context of cognitive behavior therapy or other 
experimental studies. Participants who met the above criteria, and indicated an interest in 
participating in future studies were emailed by the PI who informed them about the study. 
Twenty-seven responded to the email and of those twenty-two agreed to participate in 
Study 1. Participants who agreed to participate in the study did not differ on levels of 
social anxiety as measured by the Leibowitz Social Anxiety Scale (M = 60.74, SD = 
19.37) from those who did not (M = 57.00, SD = 21.40). All of the mindfulness 
participants (N = 14) were asked to return for Study 2 between 1 and 3 weeks after Study 
35 
 
1. Only 11 were able to return within that time frame. Participants ranged in age from 18-
56 (M = 23.86, SD = 8.54), were primarily female (86.4%) and endorsed the following 
sexual orientation categories: Bisexual (13.6%), Gay/Lesbian (4.5%), Heterosexual 
(77.3%), and Other (e.g., Queer, Questioning, 4.5%). Participants were allowed to select 
multiple racial and ethnic identifications resulting in the following distribution: Asian 
(13.6%), Black (18.2%), Latino/a (13.6%), and White (59.1%). Participants received $30 
for participating in Study 1, while those who completed Study 2 received an additional 
$20.  
 
Measures 
 US-Expectancy ratings. A common procedure in many conditioning and 
extinction studies is to measure a participant’s expectation that the US (unconditioned 
stimulus) will occur (cf. Van Gucht, Vansteenwegen, Beckers, & Van den Bergh, 2008). 
Reduction in expectancy ratings during extinction can provide evidence for a decrease in 
the associative strength between a CS and US. That is, the participant recognizes that the 
CS is no longer the best predictor of US’s occurrence (or at least not the best predictor in 
the current context). Although these ratings are commonplace in conditioning and 
extinction studies, they have not been commonly employed in exposure studies with 
anxiety disorders. However, as Mineka and Zinbarg (2006) have convincingly argued, 
many of the tenets of learning theory can be applied to our understanding of anxiety 
disorders, including the CS-US relationships. In the case of social anxiety, the feared 
occurrence (or US) can generally be thought of as the fear of negative evaluation or 
social exclusion (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Measuring changes in associative 
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relationships may be an important aspect of treatment. Therefore, the present study 
obtained expectancy ratings by asking participants to quickly rate, on a 100 mm VAS 
scale, “How likely do you think it is that (insert personally relevant fear) will occur as a 
result of giving a speech” Personally relevant fears where obtained by asking participants 
to rank their top three fears during the online screening. Fears that resemble social 
exclusion or rejection were provided. In addition, participants were reminded of their 
choice throughout the study. As this is not a validated measure, it only formed one 
portion of our process and outcome measurement battery. However, a measure of 
expectancy such as this seems to be closely related to many of the mechanisms of 
extinction noted in the basic science literature, and thought to underlie successful 
treatment of pathological anxiety.  
 Brief State Anxiety Measure (BSAM; Berg, Shapiro, Chambless, & Ahrens, 
1998).  The BSAM is a shortened version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983).  It contains 6 of the 20 items 
from this scale (relaxed, steady, strained, comfortable, worried, tense). The BSAM has 
demonstrated good internal consistency (α = 0.83) and a strong correlation with the STAI 
(r = 0.93). The BSAM was used throughout Study 1 and 2 to assess the participants’ 
current level of anxiety.  
 Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Hope et al., 2000; Wolpe & Lazarus, 
1967) is a frequently used measure of a participants’ current level of distress. Participants 
are asked to rate their current level of distress or anxiety on a 0 (completely calm, 
relaxed) to 100 (extreme anxiety or distress. The worst ever encountered.) SUDS were 
obtained before, during, and after each speech task.  
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 Willingness. Participants were asked to rate how willing they are to engage in 
another speech task at various times throughout the study. Participants rated their 
willingness on a 100 mm VAS scale. 
 Leibowitz Social Anxiety Scale - Self-Report (LSAS-SR; Fresco et al., 2001) 
measures fear and avoidance of 24 situations related to social anxiety. Participants rate 
their fear on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (never) to 3 (severe) and their 
avoidance on a similar scale ranging from 0 (never) to 3 (usually, 67-100%). Rytwinksi et 
al. (2009) report that a cutoff of 30 accurately identifies individuals with social anxiety 
disorder. The LSAR-SR has demonstrated good internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability (Baker, Heinrichs, Kim, & Hofmann 2002). This measure was used to help 
select potential participants from a large pool of subjects.  
 Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker – revised (PRCS-R; Paul, 1966). The 
PRCS-R is a 30 item true-false measure which assesses speech anxiety. It has 
demonstrated satisfactory internal consistency (Klorman, Weerts, Hastings, Melamed, & 
Lang, 1974) and validity (Lombardo, 1988). The PRCS-R was used to screen for 
participants with high speech anxiety from a larger pool of subjects, and also as an 
outcome measure.  
 The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983) is a 12-item 
measure of an individual’s fear of negative evaluation (e.g., “I am afraid that others will 
not approve of me”). Participants indicate how characteristic each item is of them on a 5-
point-Likert-type scale, with 1 being “not at all characteristic of me” and 5 corresponding 
to “extremely characteristic of me.” The BFNE has demonstrated good internal 
consistency (α = .89) in clinical samples and adequate test-retest reliability in 
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undergraduate samples (Leary, 1983; Weeks et al., 2005). The BFNE was given both pre 
and post experiment in Study 1 and 2. 
 Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS: Lau et al., 2006).  This is a 13-item 
questionnaire that measures state-level mindfulness on a 5-point Likert scale.  It contains 
two subscales (curiosity and decentering). The TMS was shown to have high internal 
consistency (α = .95) and was used as a manipulation check. 
 
Procedures 
 Study 1. 
 After arriving for the study, participants provided informed consent, and 
completed the PRCS and the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; Leary 
1983). Following this, participants were shown the experimental room, told that they 
could communicate with the experimenter through an intercom, and were told that they 
would be observed via a camera. 
 Participants were assigned to either an exposure condition or a mindfulness plus 
exposure condition. Blocked assignment was used in order to balance conditions on trait 
mindfulness, age, racial identification, and gender identity. Blocked randomization 
resulted in 14 participants in the mindfulness plus exposure condition and 8 in the 
exposure only condition. Detailed descriptions of each condition, along with a flowchart 
of the study procedures, are presented below.  
 Baseline assessment. Regardless of condition, participants first completed a 
baseline measurement of anxiety (Rating 1) consisting of the Brief State Anxiety 
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Measure (BSAM; Berg, Shapiro, Chambless, & Ahrens, 1998) and Subjective Units of 
Distress Scale (SUDS; 0-100; Wolpe & Lazarus, 1967).  
 Pre-manipulation speech. These procedures were adapted from those used by 
Baggett, Saab, and Carver (1996), Moscovitch and Hoffman (2004), and Tsao and Craske 
(2000). Moscovitch and Hoffman (2004) note that fear of public speaking is an extremely 
common fear among individuals with social phobia, and, given the high degree of 
external reliability, represents an ideal task in which to examine social anxiety in a 
laboratory setting.  
 After obtaining baseline state anxiety measurements, participants were told that in 
a few minutes they will be asked to provide a 5 minute speech about one of several 
topics. They were then given 3 minutes to prepare, although they were instructed that 
they could not write anything down. In addition, they were told that they would be 
videotaped and that their performance would later be judged by an expert panel of raters 
on the basis of poise, articulation, and appearance. Following their preparation time, 
participants completed measures of state anxiety (BSAM, SUDS), measures of 
willingness to engage in a speech task, as well as a measure of US-expectancy (detailed 
more fully below; Pre-Manipulation Speech Pre-Rating).  
 Participants were allowed to choose among two topics for each speech such as  
“Should English be the national language?”, or “Is it wrong for the government to 
execute people?” Speech topics were different in each subsequent speech task but were 
once again of a political or emotionally charged nature (e.g., thoughts regarding same-sex 
marriage). Topics were fixed at each time point. Participants were asked to speak for the 
full five minutes but were allowed to stop if they chose to. Confederates were asked to 
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maintain a neutral facial expression throughout the task and to take notes to highlight the 
evaluative nature of the exposure. Immediately following the speech, participants 
completed measures of anxiety (BSAM, SUDS), measures of willingness to engage in 
further speech tasks, and measures of US-expectancy. In addition, SUDS were obtained 
throughout the speech task (i.e., every minute). These measures were taken after each 
preparation time and following each speech in subsequent exposures. However, the 
PRCS and BFNE were not given again until after the final speech in order to minimize 
participant burden and streamline assessment procedures (Post-Speech 3 Rating; see 
flowchart below).  
 Manipulation. Participants completed a total of 3 additional speeches, in a massed 
exposure fashion, by closely following the procedures above. Completing several 
additional exposures allowed us to measure change over time, rather than simply 
comparing participants before and after an intervention. In addition, although massed 
exposure procedures result in the greatest initial decrease in fear (Cain, Blouin, & Barad, 
2003), they are also more likely to engender return of fear when subjects are tested at a 
later date (Tsao & Craske, 2000). This represents an ideal condition in which to examine 
our hypothesis that a mindfulness induction might act as a retrieval cue to mitigate return 
of fear. Although there exists no single definition of what constitutes massed exposure, 
these procedures are similar to those used by Tsao and Craske (2000). 
 Participants were randomly assigned to either an exposure condition or a 
mindfulness plus exposure condition. Although participants in both conditions were 
provided with the rationale behind exposure procedures, they were not given specific 
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information regarding their respective manipulations (e.g., mindfulness) in order to 
minimize expectancy. 
 Following the pre-manipulation speech, individuals in the mindfulness plus 
exposure condition listened to an audiotaped description of mindfulness in addition to 
engaging in an experiential mindfulness exercise. This took approximately 15 minutes. 
Similar procedures have been shown to elicit mindfulness in the laboratory (Erisman & 
Roemer, 2010). Participants then completed the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau et 
al., 2006) as a manipulation check. Given the length of this initial manipulation, 
participants prepared for their speech following the manipulation. For the next two 
exposures, individuals completed another mindfulness exercise directly prior to each 
speech task (immediately following their preparation time). These mindfulness exercises 
consisted of mindfulness of sounds and physical sensations (please see appendix 
materials for a description). It was hypothesized that this introduction to mindfulness 
would induce the broadened awareness necessary for enhanced extinction (through 
awareness of multiple conditioned excitors) in addition to acting as a retrieval cue (see 
hypotheses section as well). 
 Following the pre-manipulation speech, individuals in the exposure only 
condition listened to an audiotaped radio program about a neutral topic (e.g., “smart” 
elevators) and completed a word search task. As in the mindfulness condition, these tasks 
combine instructional and experiential components. This took approximately 15 minutes. 
As in the mindfulness condition, participants also completed the TMS following this 
control manipulation. For the next two exposures, individuals in this condition completed 
word searches for approximately 3 minutes prior to conducting the speech task 
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(immediately following their preparation time). Although participants might have been 
somewhat distracted during this manipulation, they were not instructed to distract 
themselves during the exposures themselves, so this was not a distraction condition, but 
instead a control for the time spent in the mindfulness exercises. As in the mindfulness 
condition, individuals in the exposure only condition were given their preparation time 
following the initial manipulation, and prior to the manipulations in the following 
exposures.  
  Following the final exposure, individuals in both conditions completed the BFNE 
and PRCS in addition to the BSAM, SUDS, measure of willingness and US-expectancy, 
and TMS. As stated previously, it was hypothesized that individuals receiving 
mindfulness inductions prior to exposure procedures would display enhanced extinction 
and emotional processing when compared to individuals receiving exposure alone. Study 
1 took approximately two hours to complete. 
 
Study 1 Procedures 
Baseline Assessment       Baseline Rating     3 min prep  Pre-Manipulation Speech 
Pre-Rating   Pre-Manipulation  Speech   Pre-Manipulation Speech Post-Rating    
Rationale  Manipulation (15 min)  TMS  3 min prep  Pre-Speech 1 Rating  
Speech 1  Post-Speech 1 Rating  3 min prep  Pre-Speech 2 Rating  3 min 
manipulation  Speech 2  Post-Speech 2 Rating   3 min prep   Pre-Speech 3 
Rating  3 min manipulation  Speech 3  Post-Speech 3 Rating 
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Rating 1 (BSAM, SUDS), Pre and Post Speech Ratings (BSAM, SUDS, willingness, US-
expectancy), Post-Speech 3 Rating (BSAM, SUDS, BFNE, PRCS, willingness, US-
expectancy, TMS)  
 
 Study 2. 
 In order to examine whether or not mindfulness inductions during exposure 
procedures could act as a retrieval cue to mitigate return of fear, the 14 participants who 
received mindfulness inductions prior to their exposures were invited back between one 
and three weeks after the massed exposure session. Only eleven participants were able to 
participate within the allotted time frame. Participants were randomly assigned to either 
one of two conditions: another mindfulness induction prior to a speech task (retrieval cue 
condition, N = 5) or to a non-retrieval cue condition (N = 6).  
 Procedures. 
 Apart from the particular manipulation, procedures for participants in both 
conditions followed those from Study 1, with only a single speech exposure to assess 
return of fear. Please see the flow chart below. Speech topics were different from those 
used in Study 1 but were once again of a political or emotionally charged nature.  
 Manipulation. 
 Following their preparation time, but prior to the speech task, participants 
participated in one of two manipulations depending on their assigned condition. 
Participants in the retrieval cue condition once again received a mindfulness induction 
based on sounds and physical sensations. Given that this is the same induction these 
individuals received during extinction in Study 1, and that mindfulness itself may 
44 
 
represent a unique internal context, this manipulation was expected to serve as a retrieval 
cue to mitigate return of fear in this sub-sample of participants. Individuals in the non-
retrieval cue condition participated in a word search task for 3 minutes prior to engaging 
in the speech task. As stated above, it was hypothesized that individuals in the retrieval 
cue condition would display reduced return of fear when compared to individuals in the 
non-retrieval cue condition. 
 
Study 2 Procedures 
Baseline Assessment       BL rating     3 min prep  Pre-Retrieval Cue Rating   3 
min manipulation (retrieval cue or non-retrieval cue)  Post-Retrieval Cue Rating  
Speech  Post-Speech Rating  
 
Rating 1 (BSAM, SUDS), Pre and Post Retrieval Cue Rating (BSAM, SUDS, 
willingness, US-expectancy), Post-Speech Rating (BSAM, SUDS, BFNE, PRCS, 
willingness, US-expectancy) 
 
 Context shift. 
 As discussed previously, evidence suggests that extinction learning is highly 
context dependent and individuals often display a return of fear when tested in a different 
context, at a different time. The following steps were taken to help ensure a different 
testing context to test the effects of mindfulness on return of fear. First, the participants 
were consented in a different room than that of Study 1, and Study 2 procedures took 
place in a different room than that of Study 1. Lighting in the experimental room was also 
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different (e.g., dimmed) from what the participants experienced during their initial 
exposure/extinction sessions in Study 1. Vansteenwegen and colleagues (2005) 
successfully demonstrated a context effect and return of fear in human participants by 
manipulating lighting.   
 Second, the time that has passed since the original massed exposure session 
represents a context shift in and of itself. Bouton and colleagues (2006) have persuasively 
argued that organisms associate a temporal context with extinction. For example, an 
organism may learn that the US does not occur during the particular trial spacing during 
extinction. With the passage of time the organism is removed from this unique temporal 
context and renewal can occur. A similar spacing of exposure and testing sessions (1 
week) was successfully used by Mystkowski et al., (2006) to examine return of fear. 
 In addition, the PI wore a lab coat during Study 2. Although these may seem to 
represent minor changes, others have used similar procedures to enhance context shifts 
(e.g., Mystkowski et al., 2006). Finally, having participants choose different topics for 
their speeches may also provide a context shift. While the task of giving a speech is a 
unique CS in social anxiety disorder, the particular type of speech (i.e., subject matter) 
used during extinction may represent a unique context.  
 
Data Analytic Plan 
 Study 1. 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals receiving mindfulness inductions prior to exposure procedures 
would display enhanced extinction and emotional processing, as measured by the BFNE 
and PRCS (Post-Speech 3 Rating), when compared to individuals receiving exposure 
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alone. This hypothesis was tested using two univariate ANCOVAs, with the final BFNE 
and PRCS scores as dependent measures and baseline measurements of the same scale as 
the covariate. 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals receiving mindfulness inductions prior to exposure procedures 
would display enhanced extinction and emotional processing throughout the series of 
massed exposures, when compared to individuals receiving exposure alone. Enhanced 
extinction and emotional processing was measured by a greater decrease in scores on the 
BSAM and US-expectancy ratings, increased willingness to engage in further speech 
tasks, and a greater decrease in average SUDS ratings over the series of exposures 
(separate average for each of the three speeches). A series of latent growth curves were 
calculated using Mplus 3.13 software (Muthén & Muthén, 2006) to examine the 
trajectory of change among these variables.  Given the small sample size, ANCOVAs 
were also conducted as a check on the latent growth curve results with the covariate set at 
the Pre-Manipulation Speech Post-Rating (just following the baseline speech) and the 
dependent variable set at the Post-Speech 3 Rating (final rating)  . Latent growth curve 
modeling measures growth using two parameters: the intercept, or initial level, and the 
slope, or average rate of change between time points. For potential changes in state 
anxiety, US-expectancy ratings, willingness, and distress the intercept, or starting value, 
was set at the Post-Manipulation Speech Rating (just following the baseline speech) to 
control for initial distress to this task. For average SUDS during each speech, the 
intercept was set at the average SUDS ratings during the baseline speech.  
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 Study 2. 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals who receive a retrieval cue (i.e., another mindfulness 
induction) would display reduced return of fear when compared to individuals who do 
not receive a retrieval cue when tested in a different context, at a different time. Return of 
fear was measured by BSAM, SUDS, and US-expectancy ratings that occur just 
following their speech preparation. Residual gain scores were then calculated for each 
group’s mean score at the Post-Retrieval Cue Rating (after the introduction of the 
retrieval cue) taking into account their scores at the Pre-Retrieval Cue Rating (just 
following their speech preparation) in order to examine the effect of the retrieval cue 
condition, while preserving power by not using a covariate model.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Data were screened for normality. Means for all variables, at each time point, are 
presented in Table 1-6. In addition, variables were examined in each group condition. All 
variables were normally distributed and no outliers were present. Given the small sample 
size, and the potential for Type II error, effect sizes will be reported for all analyses with 
“small”, “medium”, and “large” corresponding with .20, .50, and .80 for Cohen’s d and 
.01, .06, and .14 for partialη2 respectively. However, the direction of effects will only be 
interpreted for results with a significant trend and a medium or greater effect size.  
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Distress Ratings 
 Mindfulness Control 
Baseline Rating 25.39 (19.84) 26.86 (25.49) 
PMSPR 48.15 (15.09) 51.25 (31.25) 
PMSP 60.71 (20.93) 58.12 (35.85) 
Pre-Speech 1 37.14 (15.90) 38.86 (23.82) 
Post-Speech 1 32.86 (15.90) 50.00 (31.28) 
Pre-Speech 2 42.86 (18.58) 46.86 (27.12) 
Post-Speech 2 32.42 (26.87) 50.00 (29.40) 
Pre-Speech 3 33.79 (24.38) 46.86 (21.87) 
Post-Speech 3 29.50 (27.63) 41.63 (26.85) 
  
Note. PMSPR = Pre-Manipulation Speech Pre-Rating, PMSP = Pre-Manipulation  Speech 
Post-Rating 
 
Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations of Willingness Ratings 
 Mindfulness Control 
PMSPR 48.08 (28.54) 40.00 (30.36) 
PMSP 35.71 (25.93) 30.00 (27.77) 
Pre-Speech 1 49.29 (22.00) 40.00 (32.66) 
Post-Speech 1 55.00 (19.11) 37.50 (29.15) 
Pre-Speech 2 50.64 (23.82) 46.25 (24.46) 
Post-Speech 2 55.00 (26.62) 37.50 (32.40) 
Pre-Speech 3 48.93 (28.70) 38.75 (33.14) 
Post-Speech 3 55.00 (24.42) 42.25 (36.10) 
 
Note. PMSPR = Pre-Manipulation Speech Pre-Rating, PMSP = Pre-Manipulation  Speech 
Post-Rating 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of US-Expectancy Ratings 
 Mindfulness Control 
PMSPR 63.77 (21.72) 57.75 (35.70) 
PMSP 71.43 (25.07) 62.50 (33.27) 
Pre-Speech 1 55.00 (22.79) 64.29 (22.99) 
Post-Speech 1 46.43 (22.74) 65.00 (19.27) 
Pre-Speech 2 44.29 (21.74) 55.62 (22.60) 
Post-Speech 2 40.71 (26.15) 61.88 (21.37) 
Pre-Speech 3 42.14 (26.65) 59.38 (29.33) 
Post-Speech 3 37.14 (30.49) 55.63 (28.71) 
 
Note. PMSPR = Pre-Manipulation Speech Pre-Rating, PMSP = Pre-Manipulation  Speech 
Post-Rating 
 
 
Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations of State Anxiety Ratings 
 Mindfulness Control 
PMSPR 18.07 (3.07) 18.00 (4.84) 
PMSP 13.14 (3.51) 12.87 (4.94) 
Pre-Speech 1 11.93 (4.20) 12.00 (5.15) 
Post-Speech 1 16.36 (2.44) 13.13 (4.61) 
Pre-Speech 2 16.79 (3.21) 15.00 (4.50) 
Post-Speech 2 16.29 (3.27) 14.13 (4.82) 
Pre-Speech 3 16.00 (3.85) 14.13 (5.41) 
Post-Speech 3 16.43 (4.55) 13.63 (4.84) 
 
Note. PMSPR = Pre-Manipulation Speech Pre-Rating, PMSP = Pre-Manipulation  Speech 
Post-Rating 
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations of SUDS Ratings During the Speech Task 
 Mindfulness Control 
PMS 62.32 (15.77) 60.73 (26.27) 
Speech 1 39.94 (15.07) 50.96 (23.17) 
Speech 2 35.89 (20.62) 45.58 (24.96) 
Speech 3 34.21 (22.80) 48.00 (24.01) 
 
 
Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations of Social Anxiety and Mindfulness  
 Mindfulness  Control  
 Pre Post Pre Post 
PRCS 19.54 (7.04) 17.79 (7.19) 18.57 (6.45) 19.12 (6.79) 
BFNE 41.93 (8.72) 40.57 (7.43) 44.00 (9.97) 44.12 (9.37 
LSAS 58.73 (19.09) 64.19 (20.68) 
FFMQ 114.07 (13.57) 107.25 (19.61) 
 
 
Equivalence Ratings 
 In order to examine potential differences in between group levels of social 
anxiety, mindfulness, distress, and US-expectancy ratings prior to the manipulation and 
the experiment several independent t-tests were conducted.  There were no significant 
between group differences in social anxiety as measured by the LSAS (M = 58.77, SD = 
19.10, M = 64.19, SD = 20.68 for mindfulness and control respectively), t(20) = .62, p = 
.54, d = .27, PRCS (M = 19.54, SD = 7.04, M = 18.57, SD = 6.45 for mindfulness and 
control respectively), t(18) = -.30, p = .77, d = .14, or BFNE (M = 41.93, SD = 8.72, M = 
44.00, SD = 9.97 for mindfulness and control respectively), t(20) = .51, p = .62, d = .22. 
There were no significant between group differences in trait mindfulness as measured by 
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the FFMQ (M = 114.07, SD = 13.57, M = 107.26, SD = 19.61 for mindfulness and 
control respectively), t(19) =   -.94, p = .36, d = .40. There were also no significant 
between group differences in age (M = 25.07, SD = 10.05, M = 21.75, SD = 4.80 for 
mindfulness and control respectively), t(20) = -.87, p = .39, d = .42, sex χ2 (1) = .01, p = 
.91, or race χ2 (1) = 1.32, p = .25. 
 Ratings following the initial baseline speech preparation (Pre-Manipulation 
Speech Pre-Rating) were also examined for equivalence.  At this time point, there were 
no significant between group differences in SUDS (M = 48.15, SD = 15.09, M = 51.25, 
SD = 31.25 for mindfulness and control respectively), t(9.04) = .26, p = .80, d = .13, 
willingness (M = 48.08, SD = 28.54.10, M = 40.00, SD = 30.36 for mindfulness and 
control respectively), t(19) = -.62, p = .55, d = .27, state anxiety (M = 13.14, SD = 3.51, 
M = 12.88, SD = 4.94 for mindfulness and control respectively), t(20) = -.15, p = .88, d = 
.06, or US-expectancy ratings (M = 63.77, SD = 21.71, M = 57.75, SD = 35.70 for 
mindfulness and control respectively), t(19) = -.48, p = .63, d = .20. Ratings 
following the baseline speech (Pre-Manipulation Speech Post-Rating), were also 
examined for equivalence. At this time point, there were also no significant between 
group differences in SUDS (M = 60.71, SD = 20.93, M = 58.13, SD = 35.85 for 
mindfulness and control respectively), t(9.79) = -.19, p = .88, d = .09, willingness (M = 
35.71, SD = 25.93.10, M = 30.00, SD = 27.77 for mindfulness and control respectively), 
t(20) = -.49, p = .63, d = .56, state anxiety (M = 11.93, SD = 4.20, M = 12.00, SD = 5.15 
for mindfulness and control respectively), t(20) = .03, p = .97, d = .56, or US-expectancy 
ratings (M = 71.43, SD = 21.71, M = 57.75, SD = 35.70 for mindfulness and control 
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respectively), t(19) = -.48, p = .63, d = .56. Based on these analyses, we determined that 
the groups were equivalent prior to the beginning of the experiment.  
 In order to examine whether our mindfulness induction was successful in 
inducing a state of mindfulness independent sample t-tests were conducted comparing 
scores on the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS) given immediately following the 
inductions in both conditions. A significant trend emerged for individuals in the 
mindfulness condition to report more curiosity (M = 14.36, SD = 6.03) then individuals 
in the exposure only condition (M = 9.88, SD = 4.19) t(20) = -1.85, p = .08, with a large 
effect d = .86. Although there were no significant between group differences on the 
decentering subscale of the TMS, participants in the mindfulness condition reported 
higher scores  (M = 15.64, SD = 5.11) than individuals in the control condition (M = 
13.12, SD = 3.76) with a medium effect size t(20) = -1.21, p = .24, d = .56. 
Interestingly, these differences seemed to decrease by the end of the experiment although 
participants in the mindfulness condition tended to report higher curiosity (M = 13.78, 
SD = 4.14) and decentering (M = 14.21, SD = 16.92) than individuals in the control 
condition (M = 11.86, SD = 4.60; M = 13.63, SD = 4.14 for curiosity and decentering, 
respectively). 
Hypothesis 1  
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that individuals in the mindfulness plus exposure 
condition would display enhanced extinction when compared to individuals in the 
exposure only condition as measured by changes on the BFNE and PRCS. In order to test 
this hypothesis, a series of univariate ANCOVAs were run controlling for baseline levels 
of the BFNE and PRCS (administered prior to experimental procedures). Results were 
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non-significant for the effect of condition on the BFNE F (1, 22) = .9, p = .352, partialη2 
= .05 and PRCS F (1, 22) = 1.09, p = .352, partialη2 = .06, although the latter was a 
medium effect size.   
Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted individuals receiving mindfulness inductions prior to 
exposure procedures would display enhanced extinction and emotional processing 
throughout the series of massed exposures, when compared to individuals receiving 
exposure alone. Enhanced extinction and emotional processing was measured by a 
greater decrease in scores on the BSAM and US-expectancy ratings, increased 
willingness to engage in further speech tasks, and a greater decrease in average SUDS 
ratings over the series of exposures (separate average for each of the three speeches). In 
order to test this hypothesis, a series of latent growth curves were calculated first for the 
group as a whole, and then adding in condition as a predictor variable (see Fig 1 for an 
example). For potential changes in state anxiety, US-expectancy ratings, willingness, and 
distress, the intercept, or starting value, was set at the Pre-Manipulation Speech Post-
Rating (just following the baseline speech) to control for initial distress to this task. For 
average SUDS during each speech, the intercept was set at the average SUDS ratings 
during the baseline speech. We choose to include both pre and post speech ratings given 
that extinction processes should display a linear trend and carry over from one rating 
period to the next.  
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 US-expectancy ratings. 
 In order to examine change in US-expectancy ratings we first calculated a linear 
growth curve model for the group as a whole. The model yielded an adequate fit to the 
data χ2 (23) = 35.00, p = .052; CFI = .92, RMSEA = .15. The intercept, or average 
expectancy present after the baseline speech (Pre-Manipulation Speech Post-Rating) was 
60.33 and the slope was -2.82 (z = -3.42, p = .001). In other words, participants’ 
expectancy ratings decreased on average from 60.33 at the start of the experiment to 
43.41 by the end of the experiment. There was a significant trend for the variance in the 
slope (z = 1.72, p = .09) suggesting that other variables (such as group condition) may be 
impacting change over time. 
 A visual inspection of the group means suggested that US-expectancy ratings 
flattened over time. This, combined with the relatively poor fit of the linear model, 
suggested that a quadratic slope may fit the data better. Chi-square difference tests 
yielded a significantly better for the quadratic model χ2 (4) = 12.65, p < .05. The newer 
model yielded an overall average fit to the data χ2 (19) = 22.35, p = .27; CFI = .98, 
RMSEA = .09. The intercept, or average expectancy present after the baseline speech (the 
Pre-Manipulation Speech Post-Rating) was 63.95 while the slope was -5.22 (z = -1.84, p 
= .07) and the quadratic term was .32 (z = .78, p = .44). In other words, participants’ 
expectancy ratings decreased on average from 63.95 at the start of the experiment to 
45.15 by the end of the experiment. Although the slope only demonstrated a significant 
trend in the quadratic model, and the quadratic term itself was not significant, the newer 
model yielded a substantially better fit to the data. In addition, Z-scores for the variance 
in the slope and quadratic term were significant (z = 2.14, p  < .05; z = 2.24, p  < .05 
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respectively) suggesting that other variables (such as group condition) may be impacting 
change over time.  
 We then examined potential group differences in expectancy ratings. Given the 
small sample size, we chose to incorporate treatment condition as a predictor variable in a 
latent growth curve model rather than conduct a multi group analyses. The model yielded 
an adequate fit to the data χ2 (25) = 33.95, p = .11; CFI = .94, RMSEA = .13. The effect 
of condition on the slope was negative, and significant  (z = -2.55, p  < .05), suggesting 
that participants in the mindfulness condition had a steeper decrease in expectancy ratings 
than control participants. Although the quadratic term itself was not significant (z = 1.58, 
p  = .11) there was a significant correlation between the condition and quadratic terms (z 
= 2.00, p  < .05) which substantiates the claim that one condition (mindfulness) was 
significantly more quadratic than the other. See Fig 1 for a graphical representation of the 
growth curves for all participants, as well as separate slopes for participants in the 
mindfulness and exposure only conditions. This group difference may explain why 
previous quadratic models fit the data better despite a non-significant quadratic term. In 
addition, to examine these findings using an alternative method, we conducted an 
ANCOVA controlling for expectancy ratings following the baseline speech (the Pre-
Manipulation Speech Post-Rating). Results revealed a significant effect for condition on 
US-expectancy ratings, F (1, 22) = 5.58, p < .05, partialη2 = .23, with a large effect size. 
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Fig. 1 
US-Expectancy Ratings 
 
Note: PMSPR = Pre-Manipulation Speech Post-Rating 
 Willingness.  
 In order to examine change in willingness ratings we first calculated a linear 
growth curve model for the group as a whole. The model yielded an overall poor fit to the 
data χ2 (23) = 42.31, p < .01; CFI = .88, RMSEA = .20. Chi-square difference tests 
yielded a significantly better for a quadratic model χ2 (4) = 12.55, p < .05. The newer 
model yielded an adequate fit to the data χ2 (19) = 30.26, p = .05; CFI = .93, RMSEA = 
.17. The intercept, or average willingness present after the baseline speech (Pre-
Manipulation Speech Post-Rating) was 38.54 while the slope was 5.21 (z = 3.29, p < .01) 
and the quadratic term was -.68 (z = -2.88, p < .01). In other words, participants’ 
willingness ratings increased, on average, from 38.54 at the start of the experiment to 
45.32 by the end of the experiment. In addition, Z-scores for the variance in the slope and 
quadratic term were significant (z = -2.14, p  < .05; z = -2.93, p  < .05 respectively) 
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suggesting that other variables (such as group condition) may be impacting change over 
time.  
 We then examined potential group differences in willingness ratings. As with 
expectancy ratings, we chose to incorporate treatment condition as a predictor variable in 
a latent growth curve model. The model yielded an adequate fit to the data χ2 (25) = 
40.09, p < .05; CFI = .91, RMSEA = .17. The effect of condition on the slope was not 
significant  (z = .68, p  = .50), suggesting that participants in both conditions did not 
differ in their increase in willingness throughout the series of exposures. However, we 
also examined potential group differences using an ANCOVA controlling for willingness 
ratings following the baseline speech (rating 3). Results provided support for the growth 
curve analyses suggesting that the effect of condition on willingness ratings was not 
significant F (1, 22) = .74, p = .40, partialη2 = .04 with a small effect size. 
 Distress. 
 In order to examine change in distress (measured by SUDS ratings obtained 
before and after each speech), we first calculated a linear growth curve model for the 
group as a whole. The model yielded an overall poor fit to the data χ2 (23) = 60.28, p < 
.01; CFI = .69, RMSEA = .28. We then added a quadratic term to the model but this 
yielded a similarly poor fit to the data χ2 (19) = 58.39, p < .01; CFI = .68, RMSEA = .31. 
Given that the data did not yield a good fit for either the linear or quadratic model, and 
was therefore uninterpretable, we did not proceed with group analyses. However, we also 
examined potential group differences using an ANCOVA controlling for distress ratings 
following the baseline speech (the Pre-Manipulation Speech Post-Rating). The effect of 
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condition on distress ratings was not significant F (1, 22) = 1.61, p = .22, partialη2 = .08 
with a medium effect size. However, the direction of the results suggest that participants 
in the control condition reported slightly higher distress ratings at the end of Study 1 than 
participants in the mindfulness condition.  
 BSAM. 
 In order to examine change in BSAM ratings, obtained before and after each 
speech, we first calculated a linear growth curve model for the group as a whole. The 
model yielded an overall poor fit to the data χ2 (23) = 68.70, p < .01; CFI = .59, RMSEA 
= .31. We then added a quadratic term to the model but this yielded a similarly poor fit to 
the data χ2 (19) = 58.87, p < .01; CFI = .65, RMSEA = .32. Given that the data did not 
yield a good fit for either the linear or quadratic model, and was therefore uninterpretable, 
we did not proceed with group analyses. However, we also examined potential group 
differences using an ANCOVA controlling for BSAM ratings following the baseline 
speech (Pre-Manipulation Speech Post-Rating). The effect of condition on BSAM ratings 
was not significant F (1, 22) = .25, p = .62, partialη2 = .01 with a small effect size.  
 SUDS during the Speech Task 
 In order to examine change in SUDS ratings during each speech task we first 
calculated a linear growth curve model for the group as a whole. The model yielded an 
overall poor fit to the data χ2 (5) = 12.18, p = .03; CFI = .80, RMSEA = .26. and the 
quadratic model did not converge.  
 However, we examined potential group differences using an ANCOVA. The 
effect of condition on SUDS ratings was not significant F (1, 22) = 3.45, p = .08, 
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partialη2 = .15, although there was a large effect size. The direction of the results suggest 
that participants in the control condition reported higher SUDS ratings at the end of Study 
1 than participants in the mindfulness condition.  
Study 2 
 In order to examine potential differences in between group levels of social 
anxiety, mindfulness, distress, and US-expectancy ratings prior to the manipulation and 
the experiment during Study 2 several independent t-tests were conducted comparing 
participants in the retrieval cue or non-retrieval cue conditions.  There were no significant 
between group differences in social anxiety as measured by the BFNE (M = 41.80, SD = 
4.71, M = 38.33, SD = 7.81 for retrieval cue and non-retrieval cue respectively), t(8.33) = 
-.91, p = .39, d = .54.  However, there was a significant trend for individuals in the 
retrieval cue condition to report less confidence in themselves as a speaker as measured 
by the PRCS (M = 21.40 SD = 5.41) than individuals in the non-retrieval cue condition 
(M = 13.00, SD = 8.79), t(9) = -1.86, p = .10, d = 1.15. There were no significant 
between group differences in distress (M = 16.00, SD = 20.74, M = 21.00, SD = 18.35 for 
retrieval cue and non-retrieval cue respectively), t(9) = .48, p = .69, d = .26, or state 
anxiety (M = 20.60, SD = 3.21, M = 18.50, SD = 3.62 for retrieval cue and non-retrieval 
cue respectively), t(9) = -1.01, p = .34, d = .61.   
 We also examined groups for potential differences following the speech 
preparation (Pre-Retrieval Cue Rating) but prior to the introduction of the retrieval cue. 
There were no significant between group differences in distress (M = 25.00, SD = 26.93, 
M = 32.50, SD = 18.37 for retrieval cue and non-retrieval cue respectively), t(9) = .55, p 
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= .60, d = .32, willingness (M = 50.00, SD = 29.15, M = 48.33, SD = 37.64 for retrieval 
cue and non-retrieval cue respectively), t(9) = -.08, p = .94, d = .05, state anxiety (M = 
16.20, SD = 4.44, M = 15.83, SD = 4.71 for retrieval cue and non-retrieval cue 
respectively), t(9) = -.13, p = .90, d = .08, or US-expectancy ratings (M = 28.00, SD = 
22.80, M = 40.00, SD = 25.30 for retrieval cue and non-retrieval cue respectively), t(9) = 
.81, p = .43, d = .50. Means for all variables, at each time point, are presented in Table 7-
9.  
 
Table 7 
Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Distress Ratings 
 Retrieval  Non-Retrieval 
Baseline 16.00 (20.74) 21.67 (18.35) 
Pre-Retrieval Cue 25.00 (26.93) 32.50 (18.37) 
Post-Retrieval Cue 27.50 (28.73) 35.00 (20.00) 
Post-Speech 24.00 (19.49) 25.00 (16.43) 
 
Table 8 
Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations of State Anxiety Ratings 
 Retrieval  Non-Retrieval 
Baseline 20.60 (3.20) 18.50 (3.62) 
Pre-Retrieval Cue 16.20 (4.44) 15.83 (4.71) 
Post-Retrieval Cue 18.00 (3.74) 15.60 (3.36) 
Post-Speech 14.20 (4.94) 18.00 (3.35) 
 
 
Table 9 
Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations of US-Expectancy Ratings 
 Retrieval  Non-Retrieval 
Pre-Retrieval Cue 28.00 (22.8) 40.00 (25.29) 
Post-Retrieval Cue 27.50 (26.30) 50.00 (18.71) 
Post-Speech 36.00 (25.10) 45.00 (27.39) 
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 Hypothesis 3.  
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that individuals in the retrieval cue condition would 
display a reduced return of fear when compared to individuals in the no retrieval cue 
condition. We first conducted paired sample t-tests comparing Study 1 post-treatment 
scores (Post-Speech 3 Rating) to Study 2 scores following the speech preparation (Pre-
Retrieval Cue Rating) on the BSAM, SUDS, willingness, and US expectancy in order to 
examine return of fear for all participants. A significant trend emerged for participants to 
report higher SUDS on day 2 (M = 29.1, SD = 21.77) then on the end of day 1 (M = 
17.55, SD = 20.79) t(10) = -1.86, p = .09, with a medium effect size, d = .56. A 
significant trend also emerged for participants to report higher state anxiety on day 2 (M 
= 16, SD = 4.36) then on the end of day 1 (M = 11, SD = 9.38) t(10) = -2.11, p = .06, 
with a medium effect size, d = .56. Results for return of fear as measured by US-
expectancy was non-significant (M = 34.55, SD = 23.82, M = 21.82, SD = 28.57) t(10) = 
-1.33, p = .21, with a small to medium effect size, d = .40. 
 We then calculated residual gain scores between the Pre-Retrieval Cue Rating 
(obtained just following the speech preparation) and the Post-Retrieval Cue Rating 
(obtained just following the retrieval cue or word search). Independent t-tests were used 
to examine the effect of condition (retrieval cue versus no retrieval cue) on these gain 
scores for SUDS, state anxiety, and US-expectancy. There was a significant trend for 
individuals in the retrieval cue condition to report lower US-expectancy ratings following 
the retrieval cue (M = 27.50, SD = 26.30) then individuals in the no retrieval cue 
condition (M = 50.00, SD = 18.71) t(4.86) = 2.32, p = .07, with a large effect size, d = 
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1.48. Results were non-significant for SUDS t(7) = -.40,  p = .70, d = .28, willingness 
t(3.03) = .98,  p = .40, d = .70, and state anxiety t(7) = -.98, p = .36, d = .68.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 The present study sought to examine the potential of brief mindfulness inductions 
on exposure and extinction processes in social anxiety. Based on the findings in the basic 
science of conditioning and extinction, as well as experimental investigations of 
mindfulness, we hypothesized that mindfulness may facilitate extinction learning through 
increased awareness of multiple conditioned excitors. In addition, we hypothesized that 
mindfulness may act as a retrieval cue to mitigate return of fear. Given the small sample 
size, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. However, the results provide promising 
preliminary evidence for the possibility of mindfulness enhancing exposure and 
extinction processes, although much more research is needed.  
 In order for our manipulation to be successful, we had to ensure that the 
mindfulness instructions and experiential exercise were sufficient to induce a state of 
mindfulness. Results demonstrated a significant trend for individuals in the mindfulness 
plus exposure condition to report more curiosity than individuals in the exposure only 
condition following a brief mindfulness induction. Heightened curiosity may reflect an 
openness to present moment experience and therefore greater ability to detect multiple 
conditioned excitors as hypothesized. There were no significant between group 
differences in decentering, or the ability to observe thoughts, sensations and emotions as 
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transitory experiences rather than indications of truth (Teasdale et al., 2002). Our 
manipulation might not be strong enough to induce decentering. Alternatively, 
decentering might require greater practice to cultivate. Nevertheless, there is some 
evidence that the mindfulness plus exposure condition reported greater state mindfulness 
than the exposure only condition, although this only approached statistical significance.  
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that individuals receiving brief mindfulness reductions 
would display enhanced extinction when compared to individuals in the exposure only 
condition as measured by changes on the BFNE and PRCS. Given our small sample size, 
we may not have had the power to detect between group differences. Alternatively, the 
BFNE and PRCS may reflect trait like constructs that require more time to alter. Previous 
studies examining changes on the BFNE and PCRS examined changes following longer 
cognitive-behavioral treatments (Weeks, et al., 2005). 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted individuals receiving mindfulness inductions prior to 
exposure procedures would display enhanced extinction and emotional processing 
throughout the series of massed exposures, when compared to individuals receiving 
exposure alone. Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. There were no significant effects 
of condition on changes in SUDS ratings obtained before and after each speech, state 
anxiety, willingness or SUDS during the speeches. However, there was a significant 
effect of group on US-expectancy ratings. Participants in the mindfulness plus exposure 
condition displayed a significantly steeper decrease in expectancy ratings than 
participants in the exposure only condition. Expectancy ratings are perhaps the closest 
measure of extinction learning as theorized in error correction models such as the 
66 
 
Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model. Expectancy violation also figures prominently in several 
current theories of anxiety disorder treatment (Craske et al., 2008, Lovibond, 2006). 
 If expectancy violation is a core component of extinction learning then why did 
we fail to see a significant decrease in participants in the exposure only condition? As 
discussed previously, successful extinction learning relies on an individual’s awareness 
that a cue is no longer the best predictor of an aversive event. This requires awareness of 
the cue, or CS, and awareness of the non-occurrence of the US. There are several 
processes in social anxiety disorder that may inhibit this learning. A wealth of evidence 
points to the deleterious effects of post-event processing in social anxiety disorder. Post-
event processing refers to the tendency to imaginally rehearse the negative aspects of a 
social interaction following social contact (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  Inasmuch as a 
person is focusing on the perceived negative aspects of a social situation, including 
potential cues of rejection, they may fail to consolidate the non-occurrence of the US. 
Several researchers have also demonstrated that individuals with anxiety disorders 
display attentional biases towards negative information.  This includes enhanced attention 
to threatening information at relatively rapid stimulus presentation times, difficulty 
disengaging from these cues at moderate presentation lengths (e.g., 500 ms), and 
avoiding these cues at longer stimulus lengths (Onnis, Dadds, & Bryant, 2011). Inasmuch 
as participants may avoid a cue for rejection, possibly due to worry of self-focused 
attention, they are once again unable to learn that the cue is no longer the best predictor 
of social rejection.  
 Mindfulness may have disrupted post-event processing or attentional biases 
thereby facilitating extinction learning. In fact, Cassin and Rector (2011) have recently 
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argued that mindfulness is an effective intervention for post event processing.  At first 
glance, this may seem different than the argument we have laid out above. However, it is 
consistent with the notion that extinction learning is dependent on the awareness of the 
CS, and non-occurrence of the US that is found in modern learning theory, and that 
mindfulness may facilitate this process in individuals with social anxiety. Moreover, it is 
possible that the change in US-expectancy ratings in the mindfulness condition was a 
result of increased awareness of multiple conditioned excitors, or facilitation of 
contingency learning as described above. The present study was not designed to assess 
the precise mechanisms through which mindfulness may impact extinction learning, but 
merely as a modest first step in this direction. However, given that individuals in the 
mindfulness condition did not report a significant change in state anxiety or distress 
across the speeches, it is unlikely that relaxation was responsible for these differences.  
 It is unclear why we did not obtain an effect of group condition on other indices 
of extinction learning (e.g., willingness, distress, state anxiety), although we did find a 
general trend for distress during the speeches to decrease, and a slight increase in 
willingness to engage in further speech tasks. Inasmuch as mindfulness encourages 
contact with aversive emotional states, it is possible that we would not see a significant 
decrease in distress or state anxiety in the mindfulness group. However, it is surprising 
that we would not see a significant effect on willingness. It is possible that our 
mindfulness induction was not strong enough, or that increases in distress tolerance and 
willingness require more time to cultivate.  
 Study 2 attempted to examine the potential of mindfulness to act as a retrieval cue 
to mitigate the return of fear. Retrieval cues are only effective in situations if there is a 
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successful change of context that prevents self-generated retrieval of extinction learning 
as evidenced by a return of fear. Therefore, it was important to try and alter the testing 
context. Several procedures, including conducting experimental procedures in different 
rooms, altering the lighting, and inviting participants back between one and three weeks 
later were used to bring about a renewal effect. Results suggested that there was a 
significant trend for individuals to report higher distress and higher state anxiety when 
presented with the possibility of performing another speech task. However, there 
appeared to be no return of fear as measured by US-expectancy ratings. There were no 
significant differences between the retrieval and non-retrieval groups following the 
introduction of a retrieval cue (another mindfulness induction). However, there was a 
significant trend for individual in the retrieval cue condition to report lower US-
expectancy ratings than individuals in the non-retrieval cue condition with a large effect 
size.  Moreover, the direction of the results suggest that participants in the retrieval cue 
condition reported slightly higher willingness and state anxiety ratings, and slightly lower 
SUDS ratings following the introduction of the retrieval cue than participants in the no 
retrieval cue condition. There are several important considerations when interpreting 
these results. First, although there was a significant trend in regard to US-expectancy 
ratings, we did not see a return of fear as measured by US-expectancy ratings. In 
addition, a visual inspection of the means suggests that US-expectancy ratings did not 
decrease in the retrieval cue condition, but rather remained stable while ratings in the 
non-retrieval cue condition increased somewhat. The extremely small sample size, 
combined with the inconsistent pattern of results, may indicate that the results are 
spurious.  
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 In addition, we did not compare individuals who received mindfulness inductions 
to those that did not on indices of return of fear. Extinction learning entails both initial 
acquisition of extinction learning, consolidation and retention of this learning, and 
retrieval. It is unclear what, if any, effect mindfulness may have had on these processes.   
 In summary, the present study offers promising preliminary evidence that 
mindfulness inductions might enhance extinction learning as measured by US-expectancy 
ratings. However, the extremely small sample size makes interpretation of potential 
changes in state anxiety, distress, and willingness difficult, and the ability of mindfulness 
to act as a retrieval cue requires further research.  
Limitations and Future Directions  
 There are several limitations worth noting. First and foremost, the small sample 
size makes it difficult to draw any definitive conclusions. Future research, with much 
larger sample sizes, will be needed to replicate these findings, and further explore the 
potential of mindfulness to impact distress, willingness, and state anxiety.  
 The present study was unable to determine the precise mechanisms through which 
mindfulness might facilitate extinction learning. Future research may wish to include 
another experimental group, explicitly directed to attend to multiple conditioned excitors 
during exposure, as a comparison condition. It is also unclear if the potential mechanisms 
measured here (expectancy ratings, willingness, distress) are related to overall 
improvement. In fact, this problem plagues the field of exposure researchers in general. 
Successful exposure is often measured by reduced symptoms. However, reduced distress 
during exposures has been found to be a poor predictor of treatment outcome (Craske et 
al., 2008 but see Norton, Hayes-Skelton, & Klenck, 2011), and confuses the response 
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with the mechanisms. Craske et al. (2008) argue that the best measure of extinction 
learning is re-test, but this too confuses extinction learning with both retention and 
retrieval. It will be important to develop accurate measures of extinction learning, both 
through self-report, behavioral and physiological indices, and examine their relationship 
with treatment outcome.  
 It is necessary to develop additional experimental methods for inducing context 
effects. Although return of fear has been demonstrated in both clinical (Rachman, 1989) 
and experimental settings (Mystowski et al., 2006), we did not find a strong renewal 
effect in this study. It is possible that merely returning the same building, or encountering 
the principal investigator, acted as a retrieval cue thereby mitigating any renewal effects.  
 Future research should also examine the optimal way to combine mindfulness 
with exposure processes. We argued that it is best to use mindfulness prior to exposure 
procedures, and on only some exposure trials, in order for mindfulness to become a 
negative occasion setter and not a conditioned inhibitor. However, empirical 
investigations into this hypothesis are necessary. 
 Although mindfulness has shown promise in the treatment of several disorders 
laboratory-based examinations of mindfulness are still in the early stages (Arch & 
Craske, 2006; Erisman & Roemer, 2010). It is unclear how much mindfulness practice is 
necessary to engender desired effects such as distress tolerance and attentional focus and 
what practices are ideal for cultivating particular facets of mindfulness. It remains unclear 
whether we can engender these effects in brief laboratory based procedures in meditation 
naïve participants. 
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 Given the preliminary nature of the present study it is difficult to draw any 
clinical implications. However, mindfulness inductions did appear to be successful in 
decreasing the expectancy of social rejection and humiliation when combined with 
exposure.  However, future research is still needed to determine whether mindfulness 
inductions strongly impact extinction learning, what degree of practice is needed to 
engender these effects, and the optimal manner in which to pair mindfulness with 
exposure procedures prior to drawing any clinical suggestions.  
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